Citizenship in European Thought: An Overview
Background
The subject of citizenship (citoyenneté in French) is much talked of today, from those on the established political right, centre and left, to migrant and settling communities looking for a place in the political landscape. The purpose of this short essay, written from a Muslim perspective, is to encourage a critical engagement with the concept.
The term citizenship connotes a legal status – “the belonging of an individual to a political unit (usually a state) which awards him or her a particular status and series of rights and duties.” This is of fundamental importance as it concerns the place of each and every person in relation to the power that is around us. It is of special importance to Muslims as issues of loyalty, belonging and identity are so pronounced today. To talk of citizenship is to discuss identity, democracy, the state, human rights, civil society, government, social contract, etc. because citizenship was always seen as a function rather than as a political end in itself, i.e. it is not something to be attained but to be done, and practiced. Elaboration of this notion of belonging is hence crucial.
According to Theodor Marshall, citizenship has three essential rights: civil, political and social . Marshall viewed that each of these rights were gained in roughly the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, respectively. Gerard Delanty suggests that a fourth dimension could be culture – this is especially relevant in contemporary discussions of how cultural pluralism can be addressed by citizenship (see later). For Delanty there are four components of citizenship: rights, duties, participation and identity.
But why has citizenship become so topical? A number of reasons can be identified including:
- Disengagement of individuals from the political process (this may be for a number of reasons including: the growth of large populations so that citizens are no longer able to participate directly in political affairs, lack of trust in elected officials, growing scepticism in the universalist / essentialist claims of modern political thought). A British Election Study showed that 25% of those in 18-24 age group said they would not vote in the 1992 national elections. In 1997 this figure had risen to 32%. A MORI poll conducted for the News of the World in March 1997 on first time voters revealed that 28% said they would not vote, 55% said they were not bothered, 17% felt voting would make no difference and 10% did not trust any politician. Similarly a 1996 Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR) survey showed that only 21% of young people support a political party and that 55% said they never read a newspaper.
- Globalisation and the erosion of the boundaries and identities of nation states.
- The ‘problem’ of migrants and minorities in a European context, especially Muslims, and how to integrate them. This issue is sadly often driven by concerns of security and perceived threats of cultural and political dilution.
- Enlargement and consolidation of the European Union bringing in new nations and also trying to connect with members of the existing EU nations thereby creating dual citizenship.
Classical Citizenship
In order to understand the concept of citizenship, we need to first look at Greece, the cradle of democracy and citizenship. “Man is a political animal”, Aristotle (384 – 322 BC) is said to have famously declared. This statement encapsulates the Greek concept of citizenship, that the natural place for man is the public arena. ‘Man’, here, literally means man – as opposed to woman, or indeed slave, young (below 20) or foreigner (anyone from another city). For Greek citizenship was denied to the latter four categories, thus excluding the vast majority of residents. For Aristotle slaves were “without the faculty of deliberation”, and women “indeed posses it, but in a form which remains inconclusive” , hence their task was to tend to the duties of the household leaving the free male to concentrate on affairs of the polis (the city-state). This would leave a lasting imprint on suffrage – the right for women to vote being attained in the twentieth century. How did the polis come about? Around 800 BC settlements grew in the coastal areas of Greece and small farming communities were established. The communities were initially based on clan and tribal loyalties and probably ruled by single individuals or small groups of people (tyranny). As these unconnected communities in each of the settlements grew and farming, landownership and military duties became more organised, especially when slave labour expanded and freed people from mundane tasks, the system of government evolved to became more advanced. With the growth of learning and literacy a number of city states (poleis) began to establish democratic forms of rules, albeit with variations. The first democratic city was probably Chios in the sixth century BC. Of all the poleis Athens was probably the largest and remains the most well-known. Athens had a citizen population of around 40,000, around 80,000 slaves and a total population of close to 200,000 people. Popular rule was established in Athens around the early 5th century BC and remained in place until the defeat by Macedonians around 322 BC. At the core of the structure of the polis were three institutions: the Assembly (Ecclesia), the Council and the Committee. The Assembly had a quorum of 6,000 citizens and met at least 40 times in a year, it was the place of direct, personal democracy. All major issues were to be brought here and everyone had the right to speak. Unanimity was sought but where it was essential matters were put to a majority vote. The Council consisted of 500 citizens, men over 30 years of age, and functioned as an executive to the Assembly. The Council was assisted by the Committee, a group of 50 citizens, which met daily, each citizen serving for one month. The leader of the Committee was changed every day and its basic function was to suggest proposals to the Council. The courts were also open to citizens, a jury sometime involved over 500 citizens. Citizens were elected to office by lot and terms of office were expected to be short and definitely not permanent. There was even some remuneration for office bearers.
Citizenship in Athens was thus a serious business and shaped the whole ethos and culture of the polis. The ideals of Athens – equality for citizens, liberty, respect for the law and justice have shaped political thought ever since . Aristotle felt that citizens should know each other and therefore a polis should be a small community. He felt that Athens at his time was too large. Citizens should be virtuous people who are publicly active. This spirit of public activity is eloquently expressed by Thucydides:
Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as well: even those who are mostly occupied with their own business are extremely well informed on general politics – this is a peculiarity of ours: we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say he has no business here at all.
Athens is often compared with a rival polis, Sparta, where authoritarian rule prevailed during the time of Aristotle. In fact Aristotle viewed Sparta with some degree of respect, as a city that was strong and able to educate its citizens well. For Aristotle, a democracy was not the ideal form of Government, in fact he saw it as a transgression of good government. The ideal ruler would be a virtuous king, not the masses who may not be well trained in matters of virtue. It is interesting that almost all the major philosophers of the time (whose teachings have reached us) looked at popular rule with a degree of disdain. Plato (~420 – 347 BC), Aristotle’s mentor, was even more categorical. Although he was willing to contemplate that women could attain the necessary qualities for leadership, his ideal form of rule would be that wielded by a Philosopher-King, a man so wise that he would know how best to lead the polis. (Incidentally, this notion of Philosopher-King seems to resonate with the Shiah notion of Wilayat-e-Faqih, where the rule is placed in the hands of the learned scholars of the community.) Plato was always somewhat sceptical of popular rule, but he was deeply affected by the execution of Socrates, his friend and teacher, in 399 BC. To him this was a clear example of how power in the hands of the masses could be a dangerous thing. In his Republic Plato considers the merits of democracy, oligarchy (rule by the aristocracy), timocracy (rule by the wealthy), and tyranny (dictatorship) and concludes that only one devoted to philosophical contemplation would be able to see right from wrong, bring real justice to the people and have integrity amidst the confusion of the world. Plato was perplexed how on mundane issues such as building, specialist would be consulted, yet when it came to important issues of right and wrong, it was left to all and sundry. The only solution was hence that Philosophers should become rulers, or the existing rulers should become philosophers. In pursuit of this Plato set up his academy.
It is interesting to note that the Greek model of citizenship was born in a city-state, just as in Madinah, a somewhat different model of citizenship was established by Muslims nearly a thousand years later.
The views of Plato and Aristotle were inherited by Cicero (106 – 43 BC) and other Romans scholars. Roman citizenship was the legal status defining membership of the political community, the res publica. It was now the legal status that defined the rights and duties of the individual and the actual attendance of the Assembly to perform the function of a citizen was de-emphasised. Delanty says that “from then onwards the link between citizenship and democracy was broken” . This is to be expected as society under Roman rule was far more complex than the Greek polis. Along with the legal definition of belonging, the other main indicator of citizenship during Roman times was ownership of property. Though this was always implied during Greek times, it took on greater prominence among the Romans . The Romans also developed the concept of the outsider to a more sinister ‘barbarian’, a process of exclusion that possibly roots some of today’s prejudice. As the works of Greeks had reached the Romans, perhaps just as importantly, they were translated from Arabic to Latin in the thirteenth century and formed a significant influence in the Renaissance.
Emergence of Western European Nation States
Before we go onto the Renaissance, it is worth looking at how the political scenario in Western Europe was developing and some of the historical factors that may explain the differences we see, to this day, in different political cultures across Europe. This will help to understand how, in the current time, states have adopted different policies in trying to accommodate migrant Muslim communities. On the whole there have been three main models by which EU states have tried to deal with migrants:
- The Guestworker model where migrants are seen to have a temporary presence and is primarily used in Germany, but also in Austria and Switzerland in some modified form.
- Assimilation, where migrants are seen to be permanent and therefore strategies are employed for individual integration into the culture of the state and the formation of ‘communities’ of migrants is discouraged. France is the primary example of such a country.
- Ethnic Minorities model, in which there is room for the preservation of cultural identity and some degree of pluralism is institutionalised. This model tends to be followed in the Scandinavian countries as well as in the UK.
An important factor in how a nation treats its minorities is rooted in the self-image of that nation. Germany historically had a notion of blood decent that forms the nation, perhaps due to the legacy of the Germanic tribes that were so influential in European history. It may be for this reason that Germans could not accept for so long that a foreigner (Ausländer) could be a citizen. The boundaries of the contemporary German state were formed after there was already an established notion of the German people (Volk), hence the notion of Volk is seen as more far-reaching than the formal political boundaries of the state, so a person of German blood descent settled in Italy is still seen as German. Furthermore German nationalism was partly formed in the defence of its realm against Napoleon, an external force, whereas French identity was forged in the struggle against its own Monarchy, ruling class and religious establishment. For France it is therefore the Republic and the notion of Republican Unity, the pride in the culture where all are equal that defines the self. By contrast, the UK has long been a country of ‘migration’, in which many different groups of people have settled, each of whom have left something of their traditions, culture and language. It has also had an experience of diverse Christian religious traditions and has had perhaps the broadest contact with other cultures through colonialism, factors that have forged a nation of polite, pragmatists.
Renaissance Citizenship
While the nation states mentioned above were coming into existence, Europe was ravaged by wars; wars pitting religions against each other, kings and against other kings, states against states. The heritage of the Ancients was for some time lost to Europe, but it was being studies in the Muslim world, debated, annotated, extrapolated and eventually re-translated to Western Europe. David Held suggests that the medieval Christian emphasis on the life hereafter, especially as extolled by St Augustine, may have been a barrier to citizenship and the evolution of more democratic forms of government . During this time Feudalism and rule by Divine right (Papal and Monarchical) prevailed. It was Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 74 CE) who took up the writings of Aristotle and attempted to reconcile them with Christian teachings, emphasising the ‘common good’ and ‘natural law’. The Reformation challenged the singular truth of the Western Christian world and this led to an exploration and renewed interest in the wisdom of Greece and Rome. The writings of Cicero and Livy (59 BC – 17 CE), were influential in the development of Italian city states such as Florence and Venice (the latter survived until the late eighteenth century). Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) read about the strength and courage of Rome with eagerness and at the same time lamented the situation of weakness he could see around him. This led him to develop a very sceptical view of human nature and conclude that only the ruthless Prince, prepared to violate ethical norms, could succeed amidst the chaos of the day, a Prince who possessed strong will and courage.
Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679) was almost as sceptical about human nature as Machiavelli and in a famous ‘thought experiment’ postulated that if people were allowed to pursue the right natural to them, do whatever they pleased, there would be “war of everyone against everyone” leading to a life that is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. In order to safeguard against this people would need to follow natural law, to balance their natural rights. The expression of this would be for individuals to willingly surrender their rights to a strong, single authority (the Leviathan), in whom the individuals would be represented. Therefore consent, contract and will are all present. It can be seen that both Machiavelli and Hobbes expressed a mix of profoundly liberal and illiberal views at the same time.
John Locke (1632 – 1704) criticised Hobbes for his views on Leviathan, which he saw as a potentially greater evil than the anarchy that could ensue from the masses expressing their will. For Locke, government was all about preservation of life, liberty and estate. And in order to preserves these essentials there must be a separation between the legislative and the executive bodies of government to avoid corruption. As people cannot directly represent themselves in government, they must choose an assembly to represent them and if this assembly betrays the people, then they have the right to rebel. Government is hence entrusted in an elected group of people. Locke articulated what would become the tenets of modern liberal thought in Europe, that government exists to safeguard rights and liberties of citizens and it should be restricted in scope to ensure the maximum freedom for individual citizens. Locke argued for religious freedom, but this did not include the right to believe in no religion. For Rousseau (1712 – 1778), who was more influenced by Greek than Roman thought, Hobbes and Locke were completely wrong. For Rousseau, all citizens should meet together to enact laws and decide what is best for themselves, Sovereignty cannot be represented.
The people’s deputies are not, and could not be, its representatives; they are merely its agents; and they cannot decide anything finally. Any law which the people has not ratified in person is void; it is not law at all. The English people believes itself to be free; it is gravely mistaken; it is free only during the election of Members of Parliament; as soon as the Members are elected, the people is enslaved; it is nothing.
However Rousseau’s views on democracy are ambivalent. One can hear the resonance of Plato and Aristotle in his words:
How can the blind multitude, which often does not know what it wants, because it seldom knows what is good for it, undertake by itself an enterprise as vast and difficult as a system of legislation?
Rousseau had said that “Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains” but he didn’t necessarily want to break those chains. In the words of Derek Heater “he wanted to make them legitimate, to achieve their mutation into a linkage that would provide mankind with a moral, positive form of freedom: the republican way.” It seems that Rousseau preferred small city where citizens could meet and know each other as in the Greek polis and that he held the ideal form of government to be an elected aristocracy. But Rousseau stressed that this body could never be Sovereign, that was left to the General Will of the people, albeit an abstract function of the people. One of Rousseau’s most contentious ideas was about ‘civil religion’ through which he launches a scathing attack on Christianity and its role in history. As he was speaking of an alternative religious ideal, he attracted criticism from both Christians and secular Enlightenment figures such as Voltaire. Rousseau’s ideas were of prime importance during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries especially as some of his views were taken up by the French Revolutionary leaders.
Perhaps the most radical and powerful critique of the liberal capitalist tradition has come from Marx (1818 – 1883). Marx held that the state can never be neutral – it will always be ideological orientated. There can never be true equality while there are so many social and economic inequalities abound. And democracy can never be viable in a capitalist society. People are not individuals as such but are constantly interacting with other. For Marx and Engels, class is the key to understanding relations between people. Class will eventually disappear once the bourgeois are smashed. Even the division between state and civil society is dubious because if the means of production are owned privately then power and hence government is intertwined with ‘civil society’.
Modern Citizenship
Heater describes two main strands of citizenship: the liberal tradition and the civic republican tradition . The former in the vein of Locke, Hobbes etc., with emphasis on rights and which has prevailed today and the latter, in the vein of Plato, Rousseau, etc., with emphasis on duties. The liberal tradition stresses the individual’s rights and in response to this there has been a rise in what has been broadly classed as ‘communitarian’ formations of citizenship advocated by Amitai Etzioni, Alasdair MacIntyre and others, especially in the US.
For Marshall the contemporary fascination with rights is due to the development of capitalism. Since capitalism is based on consumption and freedom, he suggests that the development of rights and law was essential to business success. Turner critically mentions that “the growth of modernity is a movement from de jure inequalities in terms of legitimate status hierarchies to de facto inequalities as a consequence of naked market forces where the labourer is defined as a ‘free’ person.” The communitarian school emphasises responsibility and community in an attempt to counteract what it sees as a selfish, liberal, rights-based culture. This in turn is challenged by feminist critiques of communitarianism which attacks the notion of ‘family values’ etc, as upholding the patriarchal structures that have oppressed women. During the 1990s with a decline in the political support for the traditional left and right, it is an influence of communitarianism that is central to the ‘Third Way’ politics of Dewey, Giddens et al., taken up by Blair and Clinton.
Equality and Difference
As equality is one of the fundamental tenets of modern conceptions of citizenship, we need to ask how this is to be manifest? What is equality in the context of, say, a number of newly arrived migrants living in a modern nation state in Europe? Or, to look at the whole world where there are around 200 states, at least 5,000 ethnic groups and over 600 living languages. How does one apply the notion of citizenship which has traditionally meant to be ‘us’ and not ‘them’. Does equality in this context imply equal access to law? Participation in politics? Recognition of individual and collective rights? Access to employment, education, welfare, health, etc? What about one’s heritage? Is there a right to protect or even promote one’s heritage, whatever that may be? Can equality be something that is blind, or does it mean that diversity has to be heeded to as well? For example, the need for an appreciation of difference is touched upon in one of Aesop’s Fables, The Fox and the Stork:
At one time the Fox and the Stork were on visiting terms and seemed very good friends. So the Fox invited the Stork to dinner, and for a joke put nothing before her but some soup in a very shallow dish. This the Fox could easily lap up, but the Stork could only wet the end of her long bill in it, and left the meal as hungry as when she began. “I am sorry,” said the Fox, “the soup is not to your liking”. “Pray do not apologise,” said the Stork. “I hope you will return this visit, and come and dine with me soon.” So a day was appointed when the Fox should visit the Stork; but when they were seated at table all that was for their dinner was contained in a very long-necked jar with a narrow mouth, in which the Fox could not insert his snout, so all he could manage to do was to lick the outside of the jar. “I will not apologise for the dinner,” said the Stork, “One bad turn deserves another.”
This well-known story demonstrates, inter alia, that different groups may have needs that are specific. It was referred to by Lord Lester of Herne Hill in a presentation to the House of Lords in the UK on proposed Discrimination legislation. In light of this notion of specificity, could different groups be treated differently while maintaining the principle of equality? If so, on what criteria? And is positive discrimination or affirmative action useful, or is it unfair for the majority? These are some of the questions that are pertinent to contemporary notions of citizenship vis-à-vis diversity. While considering the subject of difference within citizenship, we should remember that there can be a tension between culture and citizenship, the former tends towards diversity, while the latter tends towards integration and homogeneity. How far are the bounds of difference and if difference is not entertained, how far can you homogenise / assimilate?
The way out of this for some is to refer to, or develop, post-modern views of citizenship to challenge the traditional unified theories. While this is a clear departure from classical notions of citizenship it allows for dual (although this has been around since Greek / Roman times), multiple or concentric modes of citizenship, even extending to citizenship of the cosmopolis, the world. To quote Delanty again, “In so far as democracy rests on citizenship – along with representation and constitutionalism – and to the extent that citizenship entails participation in political community, then minority rights are essential….clearly democracy must find a way of dealing with the reality of ethnoculturalism, as very few states are, or can be, mono-cultural.”
Conclusion
The notion of citizenship is important because it legitimises the polis, the state. Therefore the survival of the liberal democratic state depends on its success in creating the citizens it is run by and whom it is established for. As Muslims we must engage with the notion of citizenship; in fact this is not a choice, for we already are citizens in the vast majority of cases in Western Europe. However while on the practical level, adoption and application is one thing, we must also be conscious of the ideological, philosophical and political dimensions of the subject. Just as liberals and republicans, capitalist and Marxists, or modernists and post-modernists approach citizenship with their own values, own conceptions and offer different forms, emphases, and critiques to mould the notion to their requirements, so must Muslims critically engage with the notion to make their citizenship meaningful and genuine. Perhaps even new forms of citizenship could be evolved, and need to be evolved. For it is true that much of the contractual approach to defining the relationship between the ruler and the ruled is coherent with Islamic political values. The concept of bay‘ah is a contract and there are now numerous voices advocating how the mechanisms of democracy and rule of law can be deemed compatible with Islamic values . The ethos of the Greek polis and direct participatory democracy stands very close to the origins of the first Muslim state in Madinah which, 1,400 years ago, went beyond the European liberal model to grant individual suffrage and right of ownership of property to women, and also allowed for instant naturalisation of migrants, whether from a relatively near city as Makkah, or as far off as Rome, Persia or Abyssinia. The concepts of hajj, ihram and daily prayer created a notion of equality that is still exemplary and deeply profound. Yet, it is true that Muslim rule also took the line of despotism, tyranny and rule by inheritance. And while Muslims may have excelled in mathematics, science, art and other fields, political and economic theory is somewhat stale and stagnant, inadequate to deal with the realities of the day. So, not only can we contribute, but we can also learn much by engaging.
However, to temper this optimism there is also room for caution. On the ideological level, we should acknowledge that citizenship i) bears an Enlightenment ethos, ii) relies heavily on the nation-state, iii) is used, at least in its liberal form, to encourage consumerism and free market behaviour, and iv) tends towards individualism. While it is true that the Enlightenment experience of Europe need not be the archetypal model for the relationship between reason and religion, for it is the case that in the Muslim world there was an entirely different relationship between scientific enquiry and faith, we cannot deny that the Enlightenment experience has left the West with a scepticism and suspicion of not only Christianity, and Western Christianity at that, but all religious tendencies. Hence, while there may be a valid argument for an Islamic Modernity that is different to the West experience, the reality of the day is that we are facing the challenge of dealing with European notions of Citizenship, Enlightenment, Secularism, etc., and hence Modernity. Part of the challenge of Muslim intellectuals is to articulate exactly how Islam deals differently with reason and how Islamic religious experience would be distinctive.
In terms of the nation-state, it is true that we have accepted the de facto existence of nation-states, and that will mean that we also have to take on board much of the paraphernalia that comes with the nation-state, such as the discourse of Human Rights to protect the individual from the state. But while this pragmatic stance is enacted, we must also lead a principled examination of how the ideals of justice, equality, liberty can be practiced in post nation-state societies, for it would seem that Globalisation is taking us in that direction anyway. Similarly, and with special reference to Globalisation (and the trends of anti and alter-globalisation), we need to appreciate the economic consequences of free market consumerism, that we could be unwitting contributors to through the creation of citizens-as-consumers. With respect to individualism, every religion has a sense of community and we must be careful that the notion of community is not eroded among Muslims who see themselves in purely individual citizen terms. As a Muslim community that is still in the process of settlement in Europe we need to develop shared narratives, common identities, not for sectarian reasons or to differentiate ourselves, but for our mere survival. How can this be made possible in the face of liberal individualism? Perhaps we could use the communitarian models of citizenship from the US, but that may not be acceptable in countries like France, for example. We must also acknowledge that by submerging ourselves as individuals we will not get rid of the problems of communal living, ghettoes, etc. as is often the object of assimilationist policies. We cannot merely close our eyes to the realities of under-achievement, poverty, low self-esteem etc, whether in Paris or London. These ‘communities’ are formed because of more complex social, demographic and political reasons than can be tackled by the assimilationist mirage of equality through individual citizenship. Having said this, recent discussions around cohesion in society do raise important concerns about the unity of society within a nation state and about the reality and potential of fragmentation, isolation and ‘parallel lives’. For a religion that places so much emphasis on human interaction, this needs to be given much greater concern.
Finally on a practical level we must be aware of i) the political climate that is driving the push for integration (or assimilation) as citizens, e.g. the fear that immigrants may dilute the culture of the country or that they are a security threat, and also ii) the reality of the social contract that we have entered into. Despite some overlap, it is important that concerns around security and counter-terrorism, which are legitimate for any society, are discussed distinct from the wider concerns around citizenship, integration and identity. As regards the second point, I would argue that, in many ways, Muslims have tried to live up to their part of the contract; they pay their taxes as others do, they are largely law abiding as others are, they are trying to work hard despite discrimination and other challenges; yet, has the state lived up to its part of the contract? On the whole, across Western Europe, I would argue that while Muslims benefit enormously from open and relatively free societies, states do not always treat Muslims (and others) as equals, as real citizens; rather, the sense of being foreign and ‘other’ remains pronounced. The socio-economic data that is available shows that ethnic minorities (and particularly those of a Muslim background for some reason) suffer disproportionately from inequalities in basic service provisions such as education, housing, employment, health, etc. The onus cannot wholly be placed back on individuals – to integrate or assimilate further, we must remember that as this is a contractual relationship and the state, being the more powerful and resourced party, should have the greater onus. An onus to crate a society where ‘new’ citizens are accepted, if not welcomed, and treated with dignity and equality. Yet all too often, the reality is that xenophobia is often the order of the day. Hence we must bear in mind that citizenship is not just a tool towards enhanced civic and political participation, but is a political issue in itself.
Dilwar Hussain
Shortened version - 3.rd Sept 2006